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CONCLUSION
A. SUMMARY
In setting out to construct a comprehensive record of
the network of international transactions of all types
for a number of years, we had in mind three object-
ives. The statistical objective was to show what was
involved in constructing such a record from different
national sources and to consider whether or not it
was sufficiently reliable to be useful. Such a record
had never been prepared before, and once we had it
our second objective was to observe the nature of in-.
ternational economic relationships during the period
—the size, composition, and geographic structure
of trading, the pattern of financial interrelation-
ships, and the character and extent of multilateral-
ism. Our third objective was to employ the record to
test hypotheses about the behavior of the world
economy. This volume has dealt primarily with the
first of these objectives, in a limited way with the
second, and not at all with the third.
Our work on the 1950—54 period demonstrates
that, with considerable adjustment and supplementa-
tion, it is possible to construct from available materi-
als a usable annual record of current and financial
transactions between world areas. Measures of
terarea merchandise trade have long been available,
but for the first time we have compiled a consistent
set of measures for interarea services transactions of
different types, net unilateral transfers, and capital
and gold flows. And from these measures we have
also derived the net multilateral settlements by which
a particular country or area used surpluses from all
transactions (including transactions in liquid capital
and gold) with one group of partners to settle defi-
cits from transactions with its other partners—the
element of multilateralism in world trade and pay-
ments. These measures add to our knowledge of the
nature and extent of specialization in international
trade and finance.
A comprehensive, world-wide, double-entry rec-
ord is more than the sum of its parts. It is a record in
which paired entries from both sides in principle
should agree and can be compared to reveal deficien-
cies in the record. By auditing preliminary trial-run
tabulations we have been led to make adjustments
providing greater consistency between partner rec-
ords and to prepare accounts for transactions of cer-
tain entities(e.g., International Organizations and
some shipping fleets) which no reporting country
included among its residents and for nonreporting
countries (e.g., a number of oil-source countries).
We have also used the two-valued record to elabor-
ate certain consolidated area groupings and to derive
estimates of transactions with partners which not all
countries distinguished in official published accounts.
By this means we have obtained world-wide totals
for partner transactions with the U.S., the U.K., and
Continental OEEC countries to compare with totals
with the world carried in accounts constructed for
those areas. The two-valued feature of the record
also has been used to examine the possibility of
improving accounts further: an effort to allocate un-
allocated transactions on the basis of internal evi-
dence in the world-wide matrix indicated that diver-
gence would very likely be reduced if all transactions
were properly allocated by partner area. We have
also studied divergences between paired entries in
the record to provide one indication of the uncer-
tainty attaching to the compilations.
Not all errors and omissions will be revealed by a
comparison of the credit and debit entries for a given
interarea transaction. We know that our record is de-
ficient because it omits transactions between East
and West Germany, between Spain and Spanish pos-
sessions, between the Soviet Bloc and non-Bloc coun-
tries except merchandise and gold, and between
France and Portugal and their Own Currency Areas
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such omissions from both sides of the record,it
probably understates total world trade and particu-
larly services.
Despite these and other weaknesses, paired en-
tries in the matrix of gross goods and services trans-
actions seem to agree well enough to reveal the basic
structure of interarea trading. However, lack of in-
formation about trade conducted through middlemen
(estimated at about 15 per cent of world trade)
makes it difficult to adjust the record to a consistent
purchase-sales basis, thereby understating the degree
of concentration of trade between the economic cen-
ters (U.S., U.K., and Continental Western Europe)
and the associated peripheral areas. Inadequacies in
reporting which were of secondary importance in
measuring the direction of gross trade were found
to be of major importance in measuring trade bal-
ances and multilateral settlements between world
areas. In general, only the order of magnitude of net
transactions between world areas and year-to-year
changes in balances could be measured; sometimes
only the direction (sign) could be known.
The pattern of divergence between credit and debit
measures of transactions has provided considerable
insight into the nature of error in the accounts. Thus,
unaccounted net capital and gold flows (transactions
reported from the credit but not the debit side)
equaled half the additions recorded to official re-
serves outside the U.S. in the period 1950—54. The
pattern of error in the accounts indicated that, espe-
cially in times of political or currency crises, substan-
tial foreign exchange earnings (apparently realized
in good part on services account) moved into hidden
capital and gold holdings. This result carries impli-
cations important for the interpretation of interna-
tional financial crises in the postwar era. Moreover,
it suggests not only that the financial problems of
governments are made more difficultin times of
stress by the flight of capital but also that recovery
from financial difficulties may be eased by the cessa-
tion of these drains once confidence is restored. Cor-
rective action may therefore sometimes overshoot the
mark.
Net services transactions and financial flows be-
tween world areas were seen to be large in relation
to net merchandise transactions, and measures of the
pattern of multilateralism based on merchandise
trade only were found to be seriously misleading.
This study has thus aimed at going beyond the well-
known Network study of the League of Nations,'
which was largely concerned with merchandise trade
balances. The pattern of net multilateral settlements
—after allowing for all exchanges of currently pro-
duced goods, unilateral transfers, and assets(in-
cluding large accumulations by Western Europe of
liquid dollar assets and gold)— proved to be nicely
symmetrical in the early 1950's. Each center—the
U.S., the U.K., and Continental Western Europe—
ran a surplus with the peripheral area composed of
countries trading principally with it and a deficit with
the other peripheral areas. Balances to be settled
multilaterally among centers and among peripheral
areas ran from the Western Hemisphere center (or
peripheral area) to the sterling center (or peripheral
area) on to the Continental center (or Other Eastern
Hemisphere) and back to the Western Hemisphere
center or peripheral area.2
Particular attention has been paid in this analysis
to the matrix of multilateral settlements. As the re-
sidual account of bilateral balances, the matrix neces-
sarily reflects all of the errors in accounting for trans-
actions of other types between areas. Apart from
error, it has the analytical meaning of representing
the element of circularity in the trade and payments
relations among areas.
The interarea balances offset by multilateral settle-
ments are to be distinguished from the usual concept
of bilateral payments balance in that the latter are
met both by flows of reserve assets (liquid capital
and gold) and by the residual multilateral settle-
ments. The interrelations between payments bal-
ances, the flow of reserve assets, and multilateral set-
tlements in transactions with the U.S. and the U.K.
could be examined from the accounts of those re-
serve centers, and it was found that payments bal-
ances of the two centers with peripheral areas were
predominantly met by multilateral settlements. A
large part of what each peripheral area earned from
or paid to the U.S. or the U.K. to meet its payments
balance was linked, through multilateral settlements,
to its payments position with other areas. Peripheral
areas trading principally with the U.S. or the U.K.
transferred receipts from other areas to the reserve
centers in excess of their need to meet their pay-
ments deficits with these centers, banking reserves
with them in 1950—54.
1TheNetwork of World Trade, Geneva, 1942.
2SeeChart 5 (panel vii), Chart 7, Part D, and Tables
A—4 and B—28.CONCLUSION 79
Two groups, Other Countries and the Continent,
had payments surpluses with the U.S., attributable
largely to unilateral transfers from the U.S., and in
each case used the surplus to accumulate reserve as-
sets from the U.S. The group Other Countries also
used part of the surplus to meet payments deficits
with areas other than the U.S. and the U.K., whereas
the Continent used earnings from other areas to
accumulate reserve assets in the U.S. in excess of its
payments surplus. Every other area accumulated re-
serves from the two centers, altogether in an amount
less than the aid extended by the two centers to the
rest of the world. The U.S. and the U.K. thus "gave
away" their payments deficit and the corresponding
accumulation of liquid assets by the other areas. The
U.K.'s ability to do this was made possible by U.S.
aid received.
In the period the U.S. and the U.K. were both in
the position of lending and investing at long term
while incurring short-term liabilities.
Payments balances among the U.S., the U.K., and
Canada and among the U.K., Continental OEEC
countries, and the Rest of the Sterling Area were
clearly interrelated through multilateral settlements.
These eddies in the circular flow of multilateral set-
tlements linking bilateral payments balances contrib-
ute to an understanding of a number of policies and
practicesof governmentsatthe time. The first
triangular flow involving Canada was directly related
to the way in which U.S. aid to the U.K. was adminis-
tered. The second involving the Rest of the Sterling
Area was a feature of international economic life
which affected the structure of the clearing arrange-
ment established under the European Payments
Union.
In other ways, too, the record of multilateral set-
tlements sheds light on the nature of existing eco-
nomic interdependence of world areas. The Conti-
nental countries which later formed the Common
Market, those which later joined the U.K. in the
European Free Trade Area, and the Sterling Area
were linked in the period just prior to the crystalliza-
tion of the Common Market and the European Free
Trade Area arrangements in a circular flow of mul-
tilateral settlements in which the Sterling Area earned
from the Common Market countries, the latter from
the Continental European Free Trade Area mem-
bers, and they in turn from theSterling Area.
Another significant eddy in the circular flow was the
triangular relationship observable in the Soviet Bloc
account in which earnings from the U.K. covered
payments to the Rest of the Sterling Area. A con-
siderable offsetting of balances to be settled with
partner areas by economic centers and the peripheral
areas with which they were affiliated economically
was observable; amounts to be settled between cur-
rency areas were thus greatly reduced.
The multilateral settlements matrix in Appendix
B provides an indication of the amount of such set-
tlements between areas in the early 1950's. Over the
five years they came to about $35 billion, about 9
per cent of gross interarea trade in goods and serv-
ices and would have been $5 billion larger if meas-
ured so as to exclude intertemporal offsetting. They
would have been largerstillif country-to-country
setttlements could be measured.
B. THE U. S. DEFICIT AND
MULTILATERAL PA YMENTS
In the years following World War H problems of im-
balance in international payments were widespread
and exchange control was rampant and discrimina-
tory. Imbalances in one country's accounts provoked
imbalances in those of others. Thus, some Latin
American countries experienced payments difficulties
not because their over-all accounts were in deficit but
because their deficits were with the U.S. and needed
to be met in dollars, and their surpluses were in cur-
rencies which the debtor country would not convert.
Government policy-makers in the early postwar
years would have been helped greatly in grappling
with these problems if they had been able to assess
alternative policies in the light of the kind of record
of transactions between world areas presented in this
book. As it was, decisions had to be taken in the
light of the partial information supplied for partic-
ular situations—for example, the balance-of-pay-
ments position of a single country seeking financial
assistance.
For a time in the mid-1950's the prospect of real-
izing the convertibility of European currencies led
to the belief that the problem of payments imbalance,
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convertibility was established, it no longer seemed
necessary to be concerned with regional elaborations
of payments accounts. To the extent that imbalance
was created by the discrimination in previous ex-
change controls and was relieved by the removal of
discrimination after the introduction of a wider meas-
ure of currency convertibility, this has been the case.
Interregional payments relations remain significant,
however, for a wider, seemingly chronic, and ever-
changing problem of maintaining international finan-
cial balance. Trade and payments relations between
world areas are asymmetrical, and therapeutic meas-
ures bear differently on different areas as they ramify
out through a world-wide network of interarea rela-
tionships.
The concern of the Western world in the early
1960's has been largely focused on the dollar. The
postwar dollar shortage has been succeeded by the
U.S. balance-of-payments deficit as the subject ab-
sorbing the interest of policy-makers, economists,
bankers, and others. Yet, with all that has been
written on this problem, there is still inadequate at-
tention given to the world-wide pattern of trade and
payments relationships within which the U.S. position
has deteriorated. It is important to assess the differ-
ential impact on the several parts of the world of
different measures to rectify the imbalance. For this
reason the effort of the Brookings Institution to
evaluate the future prospects of the U.S. balance of
payments in the context of a three-area trading model
of the world economy is to be welcomed.8
Even now the United States may not give due re-
gard to the interregional aspects of international pay-
ments relations.Shortly after requesting in 1963
legislative approval of an interest equalization tax on
foreign security sales in the United States, the Treas-
ury was led by the adverse impact of its proposal
upon Canada to make provision for exceptions, and
the impact on Japan threatened for a time to be
equally alarming. Without debating the merits of the
tax as a means of easing the U.S. payments position,
we can say that the incident points to the necessity of
recognizing the differential impact of measures to
influence the flow of international transactions on
different areas and hence back on the U.S. itself.'
WalterS. Salant, et a!., The United Stales Balance of
Payments in 1968, Washington. 1963. For reasons noted in
Chapter 5, Section C—6. the three-area model of the US.,
Western Europe, and third areas is inadequate.
' Interregional aspects of the balance-of-payments
problem have been given some recognition by the U. S.
It may be that the payments problem of the United
States as it appears in the early 1960's will be solved
or eased by actions on the part of Western European
countries to liberalize restrictive arrangements af-
fecting trade and capital movements and to assume
a greater share of the common burdens of mutual
security and world development. If, however, the
United States has to rely more on unilateral meas-
ures to strengthen its balance of payments, these
will most likely curb the flow of dollars to the rest
of the world, since expenditures can be more easily
reduced unilaterally than earnings increased. In that
event, it would be desirable to minimize the adverse
impact of such an action, both on the world econ-
omy in general and back on the United States itself.
In principle, this objective could be sought either
(1) by selecting measures which, by their nature,
impinge more on Western European countries ac-
cumulating reserves than on other countries or (2)
by applying measures in a discriminatory manner so
as to produce this result. Opportunities for action
of the first type are obviously limited and could con-
flict with other policy objectives—for example, the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe but not from
other areas. There may also be little scope for action
of the second type, since measures discriminating
against Western Europe could easily invite, and be
nullified by, retaliatory action. This would almost
certainly be true of any action, and especially any
discriminatoryaction,impeding imports bythe
United States from Western Europe. It is interesting
to note, at the same time, that the interest equali-
zation tax mentioned above, even though discrimina-
ting in favor of less-developed countries and Canada,
did not arouse opposition from officialcirclesin
Western Europe.
The needtodevelopanalyses andto frame
policies with an eye to the evolving pattern of trans-
actions between areas is suggested by the changes in
the pattern which are evident in the regional distribu-
tion of U.S. balance-of-payments statistics. Chart 8
foreignaid agency. As it has sought to assess the impact of
assistance on the U. S. payments position,it has found it
necessary to recognize different "feedback ratios" expressing
the proportions of U.S. aid to foreign countries which will
ultimately be spent in the U.S. (ibid.. appendix to Chapter
4,based ona memorandum by Whitney Hicks). This
particular approach seems too conservative in assuming that
Western Europe would spend no incremental exchange
earnings, hut the effort to analyze the effect within the
context of aworld-wide trading systemisalong step
forwa rd.CONCLUSION 81
CHART 8
Multilateral Settlements of the U.S. with Partner
Areas, 1950—62
(million U.S. dollars; balances to be settled)
shows net multilateral settlements of the U.S. with
six foreign areas over the period 1950—62. These
are net receipts from, or net payments to, each area
by the U.S. after allowing for all bilateral transac-
tions, including transfers of gold and liquid dollar
balances, with the area concerned. (The figures plot-
ted are balances to be settled and are opposite in
sign to the entries for multilateral settlements in the
official U.S. payments statement.) As a broad gen-
eralization, the U.S. has tended in recent years to re-
ceive increasingly large net settlements from Contin-
ental Western Europe and (except in 1962) from the
U.K., and to make increasingly large net settlements
to non-European areas. The main exceptions to this
generalization are Canada and (perhaps) the Rest
of the Sterling Area which, as far as these data per-
mit conclusions, show little change over the period in
their position in international settlements.
Some of the factors underlying these shifts emerge
from the more detailed figures in Table 16 on U.S.
transactions with Western Europe (combining Con-
tinental Western Europe and the U.K.) and with all
other countries taken as an entity. It will be noted
that in 1950—55 the U.S. paid out enough funds,
including government aid, to Western Europe to per-
mit that area to add $1 billion annually, on the
average, to its gold and liquid dollar holdingsand
still leave a small remainder for other uses. By 195 8—
59 economic aid extended by the United States to
Western Europe was sharply reduced, but its direct
balance with that area became even more adverse
with the shrinkage of the U.S. surplus on goods and
services and the rise in its military expenditures. At
the same time, Western Europe's acquisitions of gold
and dollar balances from the U.S. became so large
as to point to additional dollar receipts of something
like$1billion annually from other sources. By
1961—62 the U.S. had greatly strengthened its trade
position once more and achieved a surplus on goods
and services transactions with Western Europe much
larger than in 1950—55. In addition, the U.S. gov-
ernment obtained large special receipts, chiefly ad-
vance debt repayments, from Western Europe. These
gains were offset in considerable part by a rise in
the flow of private capital to that area, but not
enough to prevent the emergence of a substantial
surplus for the United States. Despite this shift in
the balance, Western Europe continued to add,
though less rapidly than in 1958—59, to its gold and
dollar holdings, but now with dollar receipts from
other sources on the order of $2 billion annually.
These developments in U.S. payments relations
with Western European countries were related to
This analysis is based entirely on what can be observed
from U.S. balance-of-payments statistics and does not take
account of changes in other countries' gold holdings out
of new gold production, Soviet gold sales, or private hoard-
ing or dishoarding. It should also be noted that the division
of items between I—A and I—B, or IL—A and Il—B, in Table
16 corresponds to official U.S. balance-of-payments practice.
SOURCE: Balance of Payments, Statistical Supplement
(1963); Survey of Current Business, March 1963; and
correspondence with Office of Business Economics.82 MEASURING TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN WORLD AREAS
TABLE 16
Bilateral Balances and Multilateral Settlements in the U.S.
Balance of Payments, 1950—62
(annual averages, million U.S. dollars)
1950—55 1958—59 1961—62
1.Western Europe
A.U.S. gold sales and increase in liquid
liabilities to the area, net 1,029 2,546 1,134
B.U.S. bilateral balance on other recorded
transactions with the area —1,202 —1,500 946
Goods and services, exci. military, net 1,475 573 2,538
Military expenditures, net —917 —1,590 —1,158
Remittances and pensions, net —239 —343 —258
Private capital, net 20 —79 —981
U.S. govt. capital and grants, excl.







C.Area's dollar receipts from other
sources (A +B)b 173 1,046 2,080
II•. Countries
A.U.S. gold sales and increase in liquid
liabilities to the area, net 601 1,090 1,152
B.U.S. bilateral balance on other recorded
transactions with the area —773 —2,585 —2,177
Goods and services, exci. military, net 2,326 3,567 5,257
Military expenditures, net —901 —1,379 —1,312
Remittances and pensions, net —318 —413 —463
Private capital, net —916 —2,133 —2,432
U.S. govt. capital and grants, excl.







C.Area's dollar rgceiptsfrom other
sources (A + B) 172 —1,495 —1,025
III.Unrecorded receipts or payments in U.S.
global balance of payments (IC + IIC
with signs reversed)C 345 449 —1,055
SOURCE:Balanceof Payments,Statistical
Supplement totheSurvey of Current Business,
rev. ed., Washington, 1963; Survey of Current
Business, June1964.
'Specialreceipts are somewhat more com-
prehensive here than in Survey of Current Busi-
ness, June 1964, P. 10, Table 1, due to lack of
geographic detail for items on latter basis.
' This is the U.S. total bilateral balance to
be settled with the area and equals the entry in
the U.S. payments statement for multilateral
settlements and error with the partner area but
is opposite in sign; it corresponds to the plotting
in Chart 8.
This is the entry in the column for all areas
in the U.S. payments statement for multilateral
settlements and error with the sign given in the
official account.CONCLUSION 83
the growing deficit in its transactions with non-Euro-
pean countries. This deficit reached its maximum in
1958—59, when the U.S. position vis-à-vis Western
Europe was also most unfavorable, but remained
almost as large in 1961—62 and was then almost three
times as large as it had been in 1950—55. On goods
and services only, the U.S. showed a large and grow-
ing surplus in transactions with non-European coun-
tries. But this result was outweighed by, and partly
attributable to, the great increase since the early
1950's in net payments by the U.S. to these countries
on other recorded transactions—government eco-
nomic aid,private investment, and military ex-
penditures. Only part of the estimated balance in
favor of non-European countries in recent years has
been settled by additions to their gold and dollar
holdings. Half of the balance in 196 1—62, and con-
siderably more than half in 1958—59, was used for
multilateral settlements, presumably in a triangular
flow from the U.S. to third areas to Western Europe
and then back for the European purchase of reserve
assets from the U.S.
The data reproduced in Table 16 do not permit
a precise estimate of the amount of dollar settlements
received by Western Europe from other areas. On
the basis of recorded transactions with Western
European countries, these settlements appear to have
averaged $450 million less in 1958—59, but close
to $1 billion more in 196 1—62, than would appear
from recorded transactions with non-European coun-
tries (compare lines I-C and 11-C of Table 16).6 On
either basis, however, it is clear that, in contrast to
1950—55, by 1961—62 Western Europe's gains of
gold and liquid dollars from the U.S. were no longer
attributable to its direct bilateral balance with this
country, but rather to the settlements which it re-
ceived from other areas and which were made pos-
sible by the rise in the U.S. deficit with these other
areas
6 These differences, it will be noted, relate to the residual
entry for unreported transactions in the U.S.globalbalance
ofpayments (line Ill) and to the switch in this residual
from a positive itemin1958—59,indicativeof net un-
explained receipts, to a negative item in 1961—62, indicative
of net unexplained payments. This shift was a progressive
swing of $2 billion over the years 1957—62, with the change
in direction coming in 1960. It seems to have reflected a
decline in the preference previously enjoyed by the dollar
over other currencies.
Events in 1963 and 1964 do not alter this conclusion.
The regionally elaborated payments accounts of the U.S.
for these years, given in the June 1964 and March 1965
issues of the Surveyof Current Business, showthat Western
Europe continued to accumulate gold and liquid dollar
The data presented in Table 16 can be further
broken down to show U.S. transactions with each of
the areas distinguished in Chart 8. What is seriously
lacking at present, however, is information on the
nature of the shifts which have occurred in transac-
tions between these areas, particularly between the
various non-European areas, on the one hand, and
Continental Western Europe and the U.K., on the
other. One can, of course, construct the merchandise
account fairly well from published trade statistics and
can examine, for instance, the extent to which West-
ern Europe's net settlements from other areas may
be attributable to a superior performance in mer-
chandise export competition with the U.S. But one
would also need to be able to construct for each area
the whole current account in its regional dimensions
and to measure the net flow of resources between
areas; to obtain regionally elaborated data on the
flows of government grants and credits for both
donor and recipient countries; to build up similar
two-valued records of private capital movements and
develop them in appropriate detail by types of trans-
action; to integrate these various components of the
accounts into a full matrix of international settle-
ments; to consider the mutual consistency of the
estimates and examine them, as we have tried to do
here, for evidences of the drain of resources into
flight capital and gold hoards; and to study the
records year by year to see what changes have oc-
curred in the pattern of transactions and in the ways
countries react to each other.
As matters stand, we have to study international
economic and monetary problems and address our-
selves to major policy issues without these tools of
analysis. The main elements concerning the United
States are available, thanks to the full regional de-
tail in which its balance-of-payments estimates are
presented. But matching detail for other countries,
even the most important ones,isfrequently not
available or not even compiled.
This book testifies that it is not necessary to re-
main in such ignorance. With sufficient effort, it is
possible to measure the changing trade and payments
relations among all world areas with tolerable ac-
curacy.
assetsinlargeamounts primarilythroughmultilateral
settlements rather than on bilateral account with the U.S.
U.S. multilateral settlements with Western Europe continued
in1963 and1964atabout the1962 level and were
associated with mixed developments in U.S. multilateral
settlements with peripheral areas and International Organi-
zations.